

Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities in the North of Lebanon

CONFLICT ASSESSMENT REPORT

Tripoli and Akkar, Lebanon



 **PDCI** Partners
for Democratic
Change International

 **Peace
Labz**
المركز اللبناني للتعاون والتنمية

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**CONFLICT ASSESSMENT
FOR TRIPOLI & AKKAR**

DATE: August 2013

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FOR: Partners for Democratic Change International (PDCI), Brussels & PeaceLabz, Lebanon

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Finally, it is important to mention that this assessment was implemented under trying circumstances due to the violence that erupted now and then in the north region and made travel there a risky hazard.

TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	7
I - INTRODUCTION	10
II - ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY	11
III - CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FINDINGS	12
A. Macro Analysis of Conflict for the North Region of Lebanon	12
A.1: Lebanon Country Context	12
A.2: North Lebanon Context	12
A.3: Akkar Region	13
A.4: Sources of Conflicts in Akkar	14
A.5: Tripoli	17
A.6: Sources of Conflict in Tripoli	17
A.7: Summary of Conflict Analysis Drivers - North Lebanon	20
B. Identification of ECRC Project Localities	21
C. Mapping of ECRC Project Localities	22
C.1: Beddawi Palestinian Refugee Camp - Tripoli	22
C.2: Berkayel Cluster - Akkar	24
C.3: Fnaydek - Akkar	28
IV - CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS	30
ANNEXES	34
Annex A. Desk review documents	34
Annex B. Template for consultations	35

LIST OF ABRIVATIONS

CBO	Community Based organization
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
ECRC	Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
IfS	Instrument for Stability
ISF	Internal Security Forces
KII	Key Informants Interviews
LCC	Local Conflict Conciliator
NBC	Nahr El Bared Camp
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PbP	Peace Building Partnership
PDCI	Partners for Democratic Change International
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of “Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities in the North of Lebanon” (ECRC) project is “to support non-state actors to establish sustainable systems and structures for short- and long-term interventions that prevent conflict and address the consolidation of civil peace in Lebanon”. This conflict assessment research aims primarily to assist the project in refining its implementation strategies and identifying action plans for project interventions in target localities.

The conflict research methodology consisted primarily of a series of wide consultations with key informants - national and local stakeholders, a desk research of relevant conflict assessment reports and the implementation of community meetings and workshops. A total of 63 individuals - community and civil society leaders were consulted in the process of this research.

Conflict Assessment Findings: Lebanon is far from being a post-conflict country. Various analysis of the country larger context note increased risks generated by regional developments starting with Iraq and lately the Syrian conflict. Spill over effects from neighbouring countries have added further stress on the fragile democratic system of Lebanon. Cross border shelling, increased political and religious tension, challenges of postponed parliamentary elections, a deteriorating economic situation and a Syrian refugee population estimated around one million are among the factors affecting directly and indirectly peace building efforts and stability of the country in general and for border areas such as the North of Lebanon in particular. Desk research into the drivers of conflict in the north region of Lebanon has identified the following conflict issues: In Akkar, national politics is trickling down to the local level mirroring national polarization along religious lines most recently between Sunnis and Shiites, between the opposing political camps of the 8th of March movement and the 14th of March coalitions¹ and lately among supporters of the Syrian regime versus the Free Syrian Army etc. Access to land and land ownership is also a major historical issue of the ‘peasants’ and the ‘land owners’ in Akkar. The peripheral districts in Lebanon have historically been marginalized; economic deprivation and a general lack of livelihood opportunities constituted a major cause for resentment and increasing potential for conflict in Akkar. Moreover, the feudal system remains a source of disputes in the region whereby only few rich people historically owned most of the land. More recently the Syrian refugee crisis and the armed conflict in Syria have compounded the effects of those latent conflicts thereby threatening the region relative peace.

In Tripoli, sectarian tensions between the neighborhoods of Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh dating back to Lebanon’s civil war have intensified due to the conflict in Syria. Poverty and a general lack of opportunities are forcing many youths in Tripoli’s slums to choose between drugs, crime and militant Islam. Last but not least, the 2010 municipal elections, which took place during a time of amity among local Sunni leaders, have produced consensual municipal councils in the northern cities of Tripoli and Mina. The fragility of this alliance was revealed when Mikati accepted the role of forming a new government following the toppling of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s Cabinet. The political conflict between the Future Movement of Saad el Hariri and Prime Minister Mikati has halted all prospects for development projects and stability in Tripoli.

Identification of ECRC Project Localities: The first phase of the conflict research-macro analysis for North Lebanon has facilitated the identification of two primary localities for ECRC project interventions namely the Beddawi Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli and the Berkayel cluster in Akkar which comprises in addition to Berkayel the neighbouring communities of Bebnine, El Karkaf, Tel Hayat and Mashha.

1 The “March 14 Alliance” formed in 2005 and named after the date of the “Cedar Revolution”, is a coalition of political parties and independents in Lebanon that are united by their anti-Syrian regime stance. The coalition is led by Saad Hariri (Sunnite Muslim), son of assassinated prime minister Rafic Hariri. The “March 8 Movement” is a coalition of various political parties in Lebanon led mainly by Hezbollah (Shiite Muslim). The name dates back to March 8, 2005 when different parties called for a mass demonstration in downtown Beirut in response to the Cedar Revolution and to demonstrate their support for Syria.

Additionally, the project is considering secondary involvement in a third locality - Fnaydek - to build on existing groundwork of a UNDP conflict mitigation project and to benefit from possible synergies with this program.

Beddawi Palestinian Refugee Camp - Tripoli: Mapping of the conflict drivers in the Beddawi camp revealed that the main source of conflict is caused by over crowdedness of the camp which currently hosts, in addition to the original camp population, refugees from Nahr El Bared camp and Palestinian Syrian refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria. This dramatic increase from 15,000 residents to the present estimated 50,000 has created conflict over limited space and resources more specifically water and electricity. Another source of potentially violent conflict is the spill over effects of the state of tension and sometimes armed conflicts between the Lebanese parties supporting the Syrian uprising and those fighting with the Syrian regime and or the increasing conflict between Lebanese Sunni and Shia communities. Additional sources of disputes are attributed to illegal encroachments on public property, unemployed youth, perceived nepotism and lack of transparency and accountability of the camp governing institutions, social and economic factors such as poverty, a deteriorating economic situation, a deteriorating political and security situation in the camp due to multiple factions and armed groups, failing social values, social ills etc.

Berkayel Cluster - Akkar: The main source-driver of conflict in the cluster of Berkayel is the increasing Syrian refugee population. In ever larger numbers, these refugees are putting pressure on limited communities' socio-economic infrastructure and resources, creating resentment of host' communities due to the unjust distribution of humanitarian aid and triggering an unfair competition for jobs and economic opportunities with Lebanese. Moreover, illegal encroachment on publicly owned land and disagreements over land boundaries is a source of recurrent conflict between private owners due to the lack of adequate land surveying and mapping in these communities. Environmental degradation and pollution of water sources caused by dumping of untreated waste water is causing disagreements between neighbouring communities. Furthermore, some of the Berkayel cluster of communities is witnessing internal strife between municipal council members due to opposing families, clans or political allegiances. These conflicts in local government is negatively affecting the development of these communities and causing resentment of the population who feel community issues are neglected in favour of personal self-interests.

Additional sources of conflicts which were discussed by community leaders range from business disputes over money and unsettled loans, longstanding family and clan conflicts, disagreements over electricity (generators subscriptions), youth offensive behaviour unemployment and other social ills.

Fnaydek - Akkar: The community of Fnaydek prioritized three main sources of recurrent conflicts: Disputes over irrigation water often arise between the shawy and the farmers on the amount of water allocated to their lands. These conflicts can sometimes expand beyond the primary parties and water related issues to personal, political and family related conflicts. The second major source of dispute is the fight for control of political positions of authority in the village including leadership of the municipality and political representation in parliamentary elections. Young thugs, referred to as Zu'ran in Arabic, represent another source of conflict for the community of Fnaydek. Such conflicts are described by the conflict party rather than the issues over which the conflict is taking place



which can be anything from tree cutting, sexual harassment, road incidents etc. These issues easily escalate into armed violence as the young thugs are supported and protected from justice by powerful local politicians or influential parties.

Conclusion & Recommendations: Participatory analysis with selected locality leaders has identified criteria for the Local Conflict Conciliators (LCCs) who will be trained to establish, with the support of a supervisory committee, local conflict mitigation mechanisms. Besides the most obvious factors of education, age, and gender, the participants emphasized the importance of personal traits suitable for conflict mediation and a demonstrated prior involvement, knowledge of and experience in community affairs. The community supervisory committee, to be composed of volunteer key community leaders, would meet intermittently to supervise and support the work of the LCCs when needed through intervening with conflict parties and/or securing the endorsement of key influential leaders to the conflict mitigation process.

The assessment report concludes with a set of recommendations for potential project interventions in conflict. It is important to understand that certain conflicts are too complex and deep-rooted to be tackled directly and the most that the project can expect in terms of results is to be achieved in raising awareness of the community. Some issues such as conflict over land borders- land survey can be addressed through the involvement of experts in this area to propose feasible solutions and to build local capacities to address such conflicts in the future. Unemployed and disenfranchised youth is a high risk factor, which should be addressed by the community leadership. Research in best practices in this area can lead to creative interventions and incentives for all parties to involve youth in community development that goes beyond the divisive fault lines of religious, political and national affairs. The Syrian refugee crisis would not abate any time soon. Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees should find a shared space where they can communicate in search for solutions to defuse the growing tensions between the two groups.



I - INTRODUCTION

Assessment and conflict mapping constitute one of the essential groundwork elements of the inception phase of the “Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities” project. Implemented by Partners for Democratic Change International (PDCI) in partnership with PeaceLabz in the North of Lebanon, this project is funded by the Delegation of the European Union to Lebanon through the Peace Building Partnership (PbP) of the Instrument for Stability (IfS).

“Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities in the North of Lebanon” (ECRC) is a 21-month project that aims “to support non-state actors to establish sustainable systems and structures for short- and long-term interventions that prevent conflict and address the consolidation of civil peace in Lebanon”. The project seeks to attain its objective through actions that will address four key areas:

1. strategy - building through wide consultation with national and local stakeholders;
2. capacity building and mentoring for non-state local actors;
3. small grants for targeted conflict mediation action; and
4. the establishment of local conflict mediation mechanisms that address conflict in North Lebanon in two target areas / localities.

This conflict assessment aims to assist the project team in refining the ECRC project strategy and revising its action plans through an in-depth analysis of the explicit sources and drivers of conflict in the target communities as well as an assessment of lessons learned from past and current conflict mediation initiatives. The assessment report will also suggest criteria for identifying local change agents to be trained as conflict mediators and elaborate recommendations for the project’s next steps.

Following this introductory section the report will present the research methodology detailing the assessment approach and instruments. The main section of this report will cover the assessment findings starting with a desk review, consisting of a macro analysis of the two target areas of Tripoli and Akkar followed by a specific, field research-based conflict analysis and mapping of two localities of the Beddawi Palestinian Refugee’ Camp and the Berkayel cluster which have been selected for targeted interventions by the ECRC project. The report will conclude with recommendations for action planning to guide the implementation phase of the project.

II - ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

The conflict research methodology consisted primarily of:

1. a series of wide consultations with key informants, including national and local stakeholders;
2. a desk research and analysis of relevant conflict assessment reports;
3. a review of other donors past and on-going conflict mitigation programs; and
4. the implementation of one meeting of civil society leaders for Beddawi and delivery of two community introductory workshops, one for the Berkayel cluster and one for the Beddawi Palestinian Refugee camp.

The conflict assessment and mapping research was undertaken in two phases. The first phase consisted primarily of a desk review and analysis of earlier conflict assessment research reports; 20 Key Informant Interviews (KII) with local and national stakeholders involved in the project target regions; and donor representatives who have implemented or are currently implementing similar programs. The objectives of the first research phase were to identify the region's macro conflict issues, to map the main drivers of conflict, to network with the project's potential stakeholders, and, most importantly, to facilitate the selection of the two localities to be targeted by the ECRC project.

The first research phase also sought to identify lessons learned of past conflict mitigation programs to take into consideration when refining the ECRC project implementation strategies. This preliminary research phase culminated in an agreement on the selection of two project localities: firstly, Berkayel in Qaza Akkar, comprising in addition to Berkayel village, the neighbouring communities of Bebnine, Mashha, El Karkaf, and Tal Hayat, and secondly, the Beddawi Palestinian Refugee Camp near Tripoli as the second locality. The selection of these two localities was agreed on with the ECRC project management based on a set of criteria to be detailed in the assessment findings section of this report.

The second phase of the conflict assessment and mapping research was comprised primarily of the delivery of two introductory workshops: one for the Berkayel cluster of communities on July 6, 2013 and the second one for the Beddawi Palestinian Refugee Camp on July 18, 2013. The aim of each workshop was to introduce the ECRC project to the locality stakeholders - community and civil society leaders - and ensure their buy in/commitment to the project objectives and conflict mitigation framework.

Furthermore, the workshops held with community representatives helped the project team to identify: the key drivers or sources of conflict in the target localities; the community leaders and groups who exert influence; as well as the existing mechanisms that are currently used to address conflicts. Additionally, the workshop initiated a participatory process whereby community leaders were invited to propose selection criteria for the Local Conflict Conciliators (LCC) and to discuss the role, framework and supervisory support of the Locality Committee. Once equipped with conflict mediation skills, the LCCs, in consultation with the supervisory committee, would play a central role as change agents in establishing sustainable conflict resolution mechanism in each locality. The introductory workshops and civil society meetings involved a total of 32 community representatives,² including youth and women.

The conflict mapping field assessment was completed by mid-July and involved a total of 63 individuals, namely community representatives and civil society leaders. The list of research documents consulted are included in the Annex section of this report.

² The number of workshop participants would have been much larger had the timing of the workshops not accidentally coincided with the start of the Ramadan fasting.

III - CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FINDINGS

The findings section of this research report presents the macro analysis for the regions of Tripoli and Akkar, an inventory of the applied criteria for locality selection, and an overview of the conflict situation in the project's selected localities of Beddawi and Berkayel.

A. Macro Analysis of Conflict for the North Region of Lebanon

A.1: Lebanon Country Context In 2013, Lebanon is far from being a post-conflict country, although serious reconciliation and peace building efforts have been undertaken in recent years. Even though the civil war officially ended in 1990, internal conflicts continue and constitute some of the leading challenges to development and democratic reform in the country.

Various analyses note additional risks that have significant implications for the country's journey towards peace. These include regional developments such as Iraq and, more recently, the Syrian conflict. Lebanon is a small country hosting at the beginning of 2013 more than 1 million registered refugees (Palestinians, Iraqis and now Syrians), not including non-registered refugees estimated to be around an additional half a million. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), around 455,000 Palestinian refugees are registered with the agency in Lebanon, many living in the country's 12 refugee camps. Palestinian refugees make up an estimated ten per cent of Lebanon's population. The UNHCR website indicates that by 27 of May 2013, 492,976 Syrians had approached UNHCR in Lebanon for registration; in parallel, the Lebanese government estimates that more than a million Syrian refugees have already crossed the border into Lebanon.

Potential spill over effects from conflicts in neighbouring countries have added further stress on the fragile democratic system of Lebanon. Cross border shelling, increased political and religious tension, postponed parliamentary elections, and a deteriorating economic situation are among the factors directly and indirectly affecting peace building efforts in the border areas, including in the North of Lebanon, and the stability of the country in general.


A.2: North Lebanon Context

All the above-mentioned factors apply specifically to the North of Lebanon, which, in addition to being an under served and disadvantaged region has witnessed during the last years increased tensions. These include repeated security incidents in Tripoli to the frequent cross border shelling in Akkar, and increases in the number of Syrian refugees entering Lebanon. UNHCR indicates that 34 percent of the refugees (168,982 individuals) are located in the North.³ In fact, during his visit to Lebanon in March 2013, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres, stated that "this conflict represents an existential threat to Lebanon". It is worth noting that these numbers of UNHCR refugees do not include the Palestinian refugees arriving from camps inside Syria, who are seeking refuge in and around the Palestinian camps of Nahr el Bared and Beddawi. Furthermore, these camps are still recuperating from the aftermath of the 2007 Nahr el Bared crisis.

The following section map of Lebanon depicts the number and location of the *registered* Syrian refugees in the North of Lebanon according to UNHCR sources as at May 15th 2013. To note that Caza Akkar⁴ host 55,646 Syrian refugees while Caza Tripoli has provided shelter for an additional 40,643 Syrian individuals.

³ Figures change based on registration. For an updated figure please refer to <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>

⁴ District level subdivision



Map of Syrian Refugees in North Lebanon as at May 15, 2013 - Source: UNHCR

A.3: Akkar Region

By 1997, the population of Akkar accounted for 6.4 percent of the country's population, with the largest family size in the country; in some communities, such as Bebnine, Fnaydek and Sahel, the average number of children per household is 8.⁵ The region suffers from poor governmental services and a general weakness of the civil society sector in most areas. Since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Akkar has witnessed a modest increase in assistance through new initiatives introduced by political figures such as the Fares, Hariri, and Safadi Foundations and some individual small-scale investments.

The Lebanese civil war (1975-1991) has left a legacy of conflict in Akkar as once-unified communities became fragmented through the rise of Arab nationalism, the influence of Syria, and other contributing factors.

Akkar's geographic location on the Northern border of Lebanon with Syria means that many families have members living on both sides of the border, and that Akkar's economic links with Syria are stronger than its relations with Lebanon's capital Beirut. Consequently, the present Syrian crisis severely influences the economic situation and development of Akkar and adds to the sectarian divide. Syria's conflict between Alawites and Sunnis has spilled over into the villages and communities of Akkar, which are characterized by a similar religious segregation. Opposing the current Syrian government, the largest part of the population in Akkar are Sunnis supporting the Free Syrian Army.

Inhabitants of Akkar are mainly Sunni Muslims, followed by Christians (mainly Greek Orthodox and Maronites). This region also has the largest population of Alawites in Lebanon.

5 Forgotten Akkar: Socio-economic reality of the Akkar region, Mada, 2008

A.4: Sources of Conflicts in Akkar

a. National Level Politics: The Akkar region is affected by the national context; developments, positive or negative, in politics at the national level have historically impacted the area and continue to do so to this day. During the civil war, the conflicting relations between various parties – for example between the Palestinians and the Phalanges - manifested themselves in security incidents at the local level. Such was the case in the first clash in 1975, when pro-Palestinian factions attacked the Phalange supporters residing in the Sahel and Dreib regions, in reaction to what became known as the Ain el Remmaneh ‘bus massacre’ that triggered the civil war. More recently, in 2005, following the assassination of PM Rafic El Hariri and during the 7th of May conflict⁶, the 14th of March supporters attacked Syrian workers, Alawite communities as well as Sunni supporters of the 8th of March Coalition. Later, Saad El Hariri’s⁶ visit to Syria eased the tension in the Sahel for a certain period of time. However, tension’s escalated again as a result of the Syrian conflict and the opposing standpoints of various political and religious groups towards the involvement of Lebanon in events in Syrian.

Without a doubt, Hariri’s assassination is the incident that has had the most polarizing effect across Akkar, changing drastically the region’s security context. In the Sahel and the Dreib regions, this incident was especially divisive, and different communities demonstrated for political parties affiliated with either the 14th of March Movement or the 8th of March Coalition through acts of violence. The environment is quite different in Wadi Khaled, where no sectarian or political incidents between community members were reported, and where shared traditions, culture and family tribal bonds have ensured a united society.

Agriculture is the main economic activity in Akkar. Some 21.9 percent of the male population and 27.3 percent of the female workforce is involved in agriculture.⁷ The agricultural sector is also affected by national politics as well as other events such as the 2006 war with Israel and Nahr el Bared armed clashes of militant groups with the Lebanese army. The hostilities of the summer of 2006 resulted in huge losses for the agricultural sector. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Damage Assessment noted the direct damage to this sector. While farmers in Akkar did not suffer directly from the Israeli bombardments, the hostilities hindered the timely transportation of agricultural products to market, in addition to the challenges to export due to closure of the Syrian border and the air and sea blockades. The Nahr al-Bared war had a more destructive impact on the region of Akkar. Agricultural activities in the areas surrounding the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian Refugee Camp were paralysed. The fighting also hindered the transportation of products to market. In an attempt to compensate for the losses incurred during the July 2006 war with Israel, some farmers took on loans to expand their agricultural production. But with the outbreak of the Nahr al-Bared war, another harvest season was ruined, thus leading to additional poverty in an already deprived region.⁸

b. Access to Land and Land Ownership: There has also been an historical polarization between the ‘peasants’ and the ‘land owners’ in Akkar. To this day, 80 percent of the peasants in the Sahel do not own the land they are farming. Since the peasants are mostly of Alawite origin and the land owners are mainly Sunni, the tension is often perceived as sectarian. In addition, when the Bedouins (Sunni) settled down in the area, they took the land from the Alawite peasants by force. Not surprisingly, therefore, land ownership accounts for the historical resentment between the peasants and the landowners. Sometimes, this resentment has resulted in fighting over land in mixed villages (Sunni and Alawite as well as Sunni and Christian) and at border regions of different villages. In addition, the Shia families who were displaced from Bekaa to Wadi Khaled fought with the Alawite to take over the land that the Alawite used to farm.

⁶ The 2008 conflict began on May 7 when Hezbollah –led opposition fighters seized control of West Beirut in retaliation to a government decision to shut down Hezbollah telecommunication network and remove Beirut Airport ‘security chief over alleged ties to Hezbollah.

⁷ Son and political heir to Prime Minister Rafic El Hariri.

⁸ The 1996 Agricultural Statistics, Study on Villages”, Ministry of Agriculture and FAO, 1997. “Agricultural Returns”, Ministry of Agriculture, 1998/1999

Although the Alawite (who now live mostly in Syria or Tripoli) were not historically landowners, they are still registered as residents in the area and come to vote at election time to elect an Alawite mayor, thereby causing additional tensions between the Shia and Alawite. The historical dispute over the Kamouaa area between Akkar al Atika (old Akkar) and Fnaydek is also a cause of conflict between these two communities. Tensions between the Fallahin (peasants/farmers) and Beiks (large landowners) have a long history, which peaked during the 'peasant uprising' in 1968-1969. It is commonly known that the peasant is entitled to 50 percent of the land revenue or alternatively pays an annual lease to the landholder, customarily amounting to 25 percent of the revenue. In recent years, however, the Beiks have sold their land without informing the Fallahin which has led to increased tensions between the two groups. Taking recourse in the judiciary system has resulted in Fallahin feeling resentment towards the national legal system and Lebanese courts, as the law usually has prioritized the property rights of the landowners⁹ over the rights of the peasants.

In other areas of Akkar such as the Dreib, a key cause of conflict has been the ongoing disputes over land ownership caused by the imprecise mapping of land property borders. Historically, land borders have not been delineated clearly by the state or the municipalities. In both Middle and Higher Dreib, where people mainly depend on the land for their livelihoods, a number of confrontations have been reported between families and municipalities and between villages over land borders. Some of these disputes have turned violent, resulting in a number of casualties.

c. Economy/Lack of Livelihood Opportunities: Historically, the peripheral districts in Lebanon have been marginalized. The economic and development policies put in place since Lebanon's independence in 1943 have focused on Beirut as the major economic center. Naturally, this has led to unequal growth in the country. Akkar suffered from significant neglect by the Lebanese state during the era of Syrian presence in Lebanon. Following the civil war of 1975-1990, extensive efforts were undertaken to revive the economy and rebuild national infrastructure. The government again focused most of its efforts on Beirut. Preliminary results of a 2004 living conditions mapping show that Akkar continues to have the highest share of poor households in Lebanon.¹¹ Moreover, in 2004 and 2005, the highest poverty rates were recorded in Akkar and Minieh-Dinnieh, at 63 percent.¹² Individual average income in Akkar is the lowest in Lebanon according to the Central Administration for Statistics. 22.7 percent of the individuals and 16.6 percent of the households in Akkar live on a monthly income of less than US\$40, compared to a national average of 6.3 percent for individuals and 4.5 percent for households. Poverty and lack of livelihood opportunities are causes for additional conflicts and disputes between neighboring communities over scarce resources. Additionally, because of dire need, in 1975 the pro-Palestinian parties were able to recruit armed men from Fnaydek to attack Christian villages in the Dreib and Sahel region. Though the motives for the attacks were political for the pro-Palestinian parties, the real incentive for the Fnaydek fighters was financial because they were poor and lacked livelihood opportunities. Up to this day, Fnaydek people are viewed as troublemakers with no close relationships to residents of other villages in Akkar and they remain very poor.¹³

d. Feudal System: The feudal system remains a source of conflict in the Akkar region. It is not only that a few rich people historically have owned most of the land in the region but the relative late arrival of schools in Akkar has led to high illiteracy rates and a prevailing ignorance which has in turn hampered political awareness and civic empowerment, resulting in a lack of real political representation. The descendants of the old feudal families often became the politicians representing the area, and saw no personal benefits in fighting for the development of their poor farmer constituents.¹⁴

9 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO): "Lebanon: Damage and Early Recovery Needs Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry", 2006

10 Conflict Mapping-Akkar area, World Vision Lebanon and UNDP, 2010

11 "Progress in the Living Conditions in Lebanon between 1995 and 2004", MoSA and UNDP, 2007

12 "Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon: Country Study #13", International Poverty Center and UNDP, 2008

13 Assessment Report and Design TOR, Akkar ADP/IPM Pilot, World Vision, 2009

14 Forgotten Akkar: Socio-economic reality of the Akkar region, Mada, 2008

Despite the changes brought in favor of the peasantry, inequalities between these two classes still exist. For example, Beiks have greater access to job opportunities and quality education, and vast disparities exist in income and access to quality healthcare. Although tensions between Beiks and Fallahin do not usually manifest themselves in violent conflicts anymore, the inequalities present between the two classes cause resentment and isolation. It is important to add that Beiks who own more than 80 percent of the land in the Sahel currently reside outside the area. It is the Fallahin who work on the land and reside in the area.¹⁵ This makes the issue of land ownership and the disparities between the living standards of Beiks and Fallahin a crucial issue for the communities in the Sahel, and creates additional tension at times of municipal and mayoral elections.

e. Ethnic Background/Nationality: The people of Wadi Khaled are nomadic (often Sunni Bedouin's) by origin and used to live on different sides of the Syrian/Lebanese border. When they settled down in the area of Wadi Khaled, they made a living by crossing the border into Syria to smuggle cheaper goods either for their own consumption or for sale in the Lebanese market. In addition to being marginalized because of their Bedouin origins, the initial lack of Lebanese nationality of the Wadi Khaled residents also meant lack of access to public service jobs, and limited access to Lebanese social public services such as health and education. In the 1980s, Wadi Khaled residents relied heavily on cross border smuggling, which meant they accumulated more cash money than surrounding communities.¹⁶ On the other hand, Lebanese citizens from neighbouring communities had more opportunities to join the army or other public service employment thus providing greater financial stability. In 1994, people of Wadi Khaled were granted Lebanese nationality. Nevertheless, to this day, the people of Wadi Khaled continue to face discrimination by and incur the resentment of neighbouring communities such as Akroum for Wadi Khaled is still prevailing to these days. For example, in the past, inter-marriages of Wadi Khaled men with girls from neighbouring communities often provoked retaliatory measures, including murder. At present, there is no active conflict between the two regions but we also note the absence of social interaction. It is important to highlight that smuggling activities across Wadi Khaled were curtailed recently because of closer borders monitoring due to the heightened security risks resulting from the Syrian conflict and ensuing armed clashes across the borders of the two countries.

f. Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis: In 2011, at the early stages of the Syrian refugee crisis, people in Akkar and more specifically the families of Wadi Khaled were very supportive of the Syrian refugees and they hosted them in their homes. As the armed conflict in Syria drags on and the number of refugee increases exponentially, the negative impact of these refugees on host communities in Akkar is increasing most particularly in areas of scarce economic resources and limited community' infrastructure. According to UNHCR by the 30 of May 2013, 61,027 Syrian registered refugees sought refuge in the Akkar area¹⁷. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace¹⁸, links between Wadi Khaled residents and Syrians have always been strong, as many are connected through family ties. Key players in the area point out that the influx of refugees has placed a burden on the local population whose resources are stretched thin by the unstable border situation that resulted in the decrease of smuggling activities. To control the smuggling of arms and fighters, the Syrian regime closed the smugglers' routes and lined them with mines. As a result, smugglers who used to make \$50 to \$100 a day were left without an income. Most of the smuggling was of fuel, gas, clothing and mechanical parts. Inflation is another problem; it is reported that prices of goods have doubled and tripled in some cases since the start of the Syrian crisis because of the added demand of the large numbers of Syrian refugees.

g. Discrimination in allocation of humanitarian aid: This is the main factor that caused a shift in the support of the host community for the Syrian refugees who saw aid distributed to refugees with no consideration for their own needs. Discrimination in international aid distribution has reinforced perceptions of economic injustice in an already disadvantaged community and created resentment and tensions

15 Conflict Mapping Akkar area, World Vision Lebanon and UNDP, 2010

16 Assessment Report and Design TOR, Akkar ADP/IPM Pilot, World Vision, 2009

17 UNHCR website: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>

18 Alami, Mona. "Averting a Crisis: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 28, 2013 <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/28/averting-crisis-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/g6wd>

between host communities and the Syrian refugee families. Tensions between the Lebanese and Syrians are also on the rise because of the unfair competition for jobs. Syrians are perceived as cheap labour, and “more people are turning to Syrians, who are paid \$6 a day instead of the local average \$20 rate”. Refugees are also setting up their own illegal (without permits) businesses. For example, the number of butchers in one town has increased from four to 40. This unfair economic competition is compounded with an increased cost of living due to higher demand for goods and resources by the refugee population. Additionally, the poor population of Akkar, who used to cross in times of peace the borders to Syria for free healthcare and cheaper subsidized Syrian goods, saw these markets closed to them because of the on-going conflict in Syria. Nonetheless, no major conflicts have been reported to date between the Lebanese host communities and the Syrian refugee population as the religious, family and political bonds are still holding strong. Nevertheless, the prospects for such conflicts to occur are increasing tremendously and to a certain extent, expected to happen both by the Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians.

A.5: Tripoli

Situated along the Mediterranean coast at a distance of 85km north of the capital Beirut, Tripoli is considered the country's second capital. The Caza of Tripoli consists of the cities of Tripoli, al-Mina and Qalamoun. Government neglect of the North regions has led to considerable increase in poverty as well as sizable rural migration towards the city of Tripoli. More recently, low levels of education, a high turnover of refugees and migrants, lack of public or private investment, war, regional political instability, and the economic crisis that the country as a whole is experiencing, have all contributed to various degrees in augmenting urban poverty. This is evident mainly in and around the historic core of the city.¹⁹ Rapid population growth in Tripoli can be attributed to three major factors: natural population growth, an influx of rural migrants from neighbouring Lebanese and Syrian regions, and the Palestinian exodus of 1948. This growth meant an expansion of the city, with the local tripolitanian Bourgeoisie moving away from the inner city into new quarters towards the west and south sides of the city. Lower income residents of the city and other rural migrants moved to replace the original bourgeoisie residents in the old city neighbourhoods.

Demographics: Tripoli's population is estimated to be 500,000, with the large majority belonging to the Sunni Muslim faith. Lebanon's small Alawite community inhabiting Tripoli -estimated to be composed of between 25,000 and 30,000 people - is concentrated in the Jabal Mohsen neighborhood. The percentage of Christians living in Tripoli is estimated to be around 5 percent.²⁰ The city of Tripoli is considered to be the traditional bastion of conservative Sunnis in Lebanon although many liberal and moderate Sunni Muslims live there as well.

A.6: Sources of Conflicts in Tripoli

Religious and Sectarian Tensions: Sectarian tensions between the neighborhoods of Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh, while dating back to Lebanon's civil war (1975-1990), have intensified due to the conflict in Syria. Jabal Mohsen is an area mostly inhabited by Alawites, who strongly support the Syrian government. By contrast, the overwhelmingly Sunni neighborhoods surrounding Jabal Mohsen, including Bab al-Tabbaneh- an overpopulated area of 120,000 residents widely known as a poverty pocket- are strongholds for Sunni Islamist fighters, who identify with and support the opposition fighters in Syria. According to Human Rights Watch, residents of the area reported that the armed clashes of May 28 2013 were sparked by tensions over the on-going battle for the Syrian border-town of al-Qusayr.

¹⁹ Amenagement et urbanisme, Cultural Heritage Report, Charbel Nahhas Org
²⁰ Riad Yazbeck. Return of the Pink Panthers? Mideast Monitor. Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2008

The May 2013 clashes were the deadliest since the violence initially broke out between Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh in May 2008. Moreover, the sectarian tensions and armed conflict between Sunnis and Alawites in Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh are exacerbated by poor social protection support systems and a legacy of grievances between the two communities.²¹ The history of conflict between Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh can be traced back to the 1980's with the massacre of hundreds of Lebanese Sunni civilians in Bab El Tabbaneh by the Syrian Army and Aalawite supporters of Jabal Mohsen during the drive to oust Yasser Arafat PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) fighters from their last Lebanese refuge in northern Palestinian camps.

b. Poverty: Poverty and a lack of opportunities are forcing many youths in Tripoli's slums to choose between drugs, crime and militant Islam, according to local residents. Before Lebanon's civil war 1975-1990, Tripoli was a wealthy port serving Syria, Turkey and Iraq. Bab al-Tabbaneh, one of Tripoli's seven historic gates, was nicknamed the "gate of gold" because of its thriving markets. The Lebanese civil war negatively affected the local industry, trade and agriculture, and Tabbaneh was heavily shelled. Islamist briefly ruled Tripoli during the civil war. Insurgents who rose up against the Lebanese army in the year 2000 in order to establish an Islamic caliphate in the northern province of Dinniyeh mostly hailed from Tabbaneh.²² According to a 2006 Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) report on Lebanon's "poverty pockets", Tabbaneh is Tripoli's most densely populated area and one of Lebanon's poorest neighbourhoods. Between 60 to 70 percent of the Tabbaneh's current residents emigrated in recent decades from the impoverished rural regions of Akkar, Dinnieh and Al-Minya. The CDR report mentions, "over half the families in Bab al-Tabbaneh receive about 200,000 Lebanese pounds [\$130] a month income and live in economic deficit because their expenses exceed their income." Unemployment hovers at above 30 percent for men in deprived areas. A similar study, conducted by ESCWA in cooperation with the Arab Institute for Developing Cities in 2012, sheds light on the depth of poverty, unemployment and social marginalization experienced in Lebanon's northern city of Tripoli. According to the study, 51 percent of Tripoli's residents live in extreme poverty, on a salary of less than \$4 per day. The study identified Bab al-Tabbaneh, the old city, Abi Samra and the market neighborhood as the poorest areas in the city. This is due to unplanned construction and the heavy in-migration of people from rural areas. As is well known, poverty is a cycle; it becomes both the cause and the symptom of more poverty when the root causes are not addressed. The root causes include high illiteracy rates (it reaches 19 percent in some areas like Bab al-Tabbaneh), school dropouts (half of all public school students drop out of school to seek work) and lack of services (90 percent of Bab al-Tabbaneh and Swaiqa families do not have medical health coverage).

c. Refugees: Tripoli is home to thousands of refugees and migrants from various countries in the region. Their number is difficult to assess in the absence of statistics and a clear duty-bearer. According to the UNRWA website, there are more than 16,500 registered Palestinian refugees in the Beddawi camp established in 1955 in the north of Tripoli. In 2007, refugees displaced from Nahr el Bared Palestinian camp added to the over-crowdedness of Beddawi, thus creating additional strain on the camp infrastructure and services. According to UNRWA, the major problems in Beddawi camp are: poverty, unemployment, a huge population influx from Nahr el-Bared, and high demand for UNRWA services resulting from a larger population. Relations between the Lebanese and the Palestinian refugees have always been uneasy at best. Palestinian militias played a major role in the country's civil war, a role that led many Lebanese to view the community with disdain. The legal rights of Palestinians are severely restricted in Lebanon, which has kept large numbers trapped in dire poverty.²³

Recently the United Nations reported that more than 56,000 Palestinians living in Syria, mostly from the Damascus region, have fled into neighboring Lebanon. The majority of Palestinian refugees arriving from Syria sought shelter in and around Palestinian camps.

21 Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Take New Approach to Protect Tripoli, May 28, 2013

22 Tripoli's poor swell ranks of militant Islamic groups, IRIN humanitarian news and analysis, 2007

23 Palestinian Refugees Flee Syria to Find Poor Conditions in Lebanese Camps, The New York Times, May 29, 2013

In the north of Lebanon, Beddawi camp became once more the safe haven for many of those refugees. According to Save the Children, residents in Beddawi camp reported that 1,330 families - mainly Palestinians from Syria - had entered the camp by April 2013. According to the Disasters Emergency Committee in the United Kingdom, the numbers of new Palestinian refugees from Syria in Beddawi camp has seen a population increased by one-fifth.²⁴ UNHCR reports that by May 30 2013, 10.3 percent of the registered Syrian refugees were located in Tripoli alone (43,152 individuals). These refugees add to the poverty and place additional strain on the already weak services in the city and are affected themselves by the city's deteriorating security situation. To note the fact that the majority of the Palestinian and Syrian refugees are Sunni; thus, they were more easily accepted by the host communities of Tripoli city and the suburbs.

d. Local Governance: The 2010 municipal elections took place during a time of amity among local Sunni leaders and produced consensual municipal councils in the northern cities of Tripoli and Mina. However, the fragility of this alliance was revealed when Mikati accepted the role of forming a new government following the toppling of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri's Cabinet. The political conflict between the Future Movement of Saad el Hariri and Prime Minister Mikati has halted all prospects for development projects or stability in Tripoli. City council activity has been totally paralyzed due to the on-going tension. Hence, little has been done to encourage development projects or attract investment.²⁵ A paralyzed municipality along with a divided political leadership and a high presence of armed groups in the city has increased the divide between diverse groups adding to the burden of disadvantaged people and widening the gap between the social classes of the city.



²⁴ Syria's "double refugees" face overcrowding and hardship in Lebanon, Disaster Emergency Committee, April 2013

²⁵ "As elections near tensions within Tripoli municipality abate", The Daily Star, February 5, 2013

A.7: Summary of Conflict Analysis Drivers - North Lebanon

The following table presents a summary analysis of the research into the macro drivers of conflict in North Lebanon.

	Political	Security	Socio-cultural-Religious	Economic
Local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Replication of national level politics at the local level through municipal elections generating a losing team which leads to very little consensus on critical matters and eventually undermines the powers of the municipal council. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recurring appearance of armed (sometimes masked) men in direct response to certain developments at the national level (e.g. prior to resignation of PM or after assassination of chief of internal security) - Recurring manifestations and protest with cutting off of roads and burning tires, which have become traditional means of protesting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rise of Islamic fundamentalism affecting all communities including moderate Muslims - Presence of Syrian refugees and possible frictions with local host communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Abject poverty in the North in general and in certain communities and villages in particular leading to resentment towards the government and likelihood of violent frictions. - Resentment due to aid delivered to Syrian refugees and not to Lebanese communities that are in need.
National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Uncertainties at the national level (unstable governance, resignation of PM, incapacity to agree on a national electoral law, inability of nominated PM Salam since four months to form a new government etc.) - Postponement of major decisions in order to see what will happen in Syria - Postponed elections of June 2013 and resentment of some parties that oppose the decision. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Predominance of a severely polarized political discourse amongst most Lebanese politicians, media, outlets etc... - Lack of the rule of law especially in areas such as the Northern part of Lebanon. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Escalation of both Sunni and Shiite religious extremist discourses (e.g. Sheikh El Asseer in Saida forming recently a militarized wing to counter Hezbollah's current interference in Al Qusayr village in Syria). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Average income is very low in comparison with the basic cost of living - Increase in the economic gap between centers and peripheries - High unemployment in remote and deprived areas facilitating the recruitment of youngsters into armed militias
Regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Current crisis in Syria - Tension regarding Iran's nuclear capacities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Involvement of Hezbollah in the ongoing war in Syria. - Training and infiltration of pro-Syrian opposition fighters at the Lebanese-Syrian borders. - Risk of militarized spillover of the Syrian war onto Lebanese territory. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sunni-Shiite tensions in the region opposing Shiite Iran to Sunnite Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The regional political division resulting in a Gulf touristic embargo on Lebanon under the justified by the Gulf States as concern for citizens' safety. - Constraints on the export of Lebanese products to the Gulf and other countries due to the security situation in Syria.

B. Identification of ECRC Project Localities

The first phase of the conflict research macro analysis for North Lebanon facilitated the identification of two primary localities for ECRC project interventions, namely, the Beddawi Palestinian Refugee Camp near Tripoli and the Berkayel cluster in Akkar. The selection of these localities was based on the following set of positive and negative conditionality criteria:

Risks of Armed Conflicts: Areas with high risks of armed conflicts that can negatively impact on the project interventions, delay activity implementation or constitute a security risk for the project team were disregarded. For instance, the Jabal Mohsen - Bab El Tabbaneh region in Tripoli witnesses regular flare ups of armed clashes between the various competing factions; the current hostile climate would make it impossible to implement any meaningful interventions. Similarly, intermittent and recurrent shelling is sustained in some Lebanese communities flanking the Syrian borders and in neighboring areas, which constitute smugglers' pathways for arms and fighters into Syria, such as Wadi Khaled.

Increased presence of Syrian refugees: Northern communities hosting increasing numbers of Syrian refugees were given high priority in the selection process due to major concerns regarding their presence. The Syrian refugees - coming in larger numbers with each passing day - have become a source of tensions in host communities. Often, these tensions have developed into conflicts, which urgently need to be addressed before they turn into violence. Moreover, the tensions between the Syrian refugees and the Lebanese host communities are relatively recent developments which can be addressed through local conflict mitigation initiatives such those planned under the ECRC project. By contrast, local tensions that simply reflect complex national / regional developments are beyond the scope of the present project.

Population Size of the Locality: Considering the project's relatively short duration and limited budget, it would be more effective to target smaller regions - clusters of communities - and to aim for in-depth and focused of the project interventions in geographic areas not exceeding 50,000 inhabitants per locality, rather than to expand the scope to include larger regions where the impact of the project initiatives would spread thinly.

Existence of Local Civil Society Organizations: The active presence, within the locality premises, of local civil society organizations and community leaders in addition to local governmental institutions was considered a plus. These organizations would facilitate the implementation of the ECRC project initiatives and can provide for future sustainability and organizational support for the conflict resolution mechanisms to be set up by the project.

Potential Support of Local Leaderships: Endorsement and potential support of the localities' various leaderships was a decisive criterion in the selection of the project target areas. This support was deemed essential to improve the likelihood of achieving the project's objectives and to minimize risks of stalled implementation or negative impact.

Present and Past Conflict Mitigation Programs: Due consideration was given to areas that have not participated in or benefited from other comparatively similar conflict mitigation capacity building initiatives but have demonstrated interest in conflict resolution work on the local level and began some preliminary work in this area such as is the case of Beddawi and Berkayel.

Conducive Groundwork: In addition to the project's two primary localities of Beddawi and Berkayel, it was suggested that the ECRC project can consider some type of synergies - cooperative work with a third locality namely Fnaydek. In this locality, the project would build on the established relations of PDCI local partner PeaceLabz, benefits from the groundwork of UNDP project in this community and take advantage of the lessons learned and synergies with the UNDP project.

C. Mapping of ECRC Project Localities

The second phase of the conflict analysis research engaged community leaders of ECRC selected localities in a participatory assessment exercise to identify local conflicts as well as the stakeholders that influence or have a bearing on community conflict. This section of the report presents a snapshot of the project's selected primary localities - Beddawi and Berkayel cluster - and secondary locality of Fnaydek followed by a summary analysis of the localities conflict sources and influential leaders.

C.1: Beddawi Palestinian Refugee Camp – Tripoli

a. Beddawi Camp is the second Palestinian refugee camp in North Lebanon following Nahr el Bared (NBC) Camp. Beddawi was established by UNRWA in 1955 over a 1 square km area on a hill 120m above sea level five kilometers from the city of Tripoli. The Beddawi camp is divided into four sectors - A, B, C, & D - and has two entrances, one southward from the Al-qobi region and the other northward from Beddawi city. According to UNRWA records, Beddawi's original population is around 16,500 registered refugees. This figure has increased dramatically in the past ten years primarily due to the Nahr el-Bared crisis in 2007 and the Syrian uprising in 2011. Fighting between the Lebanese Army and the radical militant group of Fateh El Islam in 2007 forced the 27,000 NBC inhabitants to flee the camp seeking refuge in nearby Beddawi camp and surroundings areas. As of mid-2009, around 10,000 NBC displaced refugees were still living in Beddawi.

The second major influx of new refugees to Beddawi resulted from the Syrian uprising. Heavy artillery shelling by Syrian government forces and armed clashes with the Free Syrian Army and various radical Islamist groups necessitated the displacement of the majority of Syrian Palestinian refugees' camp' residents to neighbouring countries including Lebanon. A Save the Children report noted that around 1,330 families of Palestinian-Syrian refugees have entered the Beddawi camp²⁶ seeking shelter and safety, thus further inflating the already crowded population of the Beddawi. According to interviewed camp leaderships, the current estimate of the Beddawi camp population is around 50,000 refugees and impoverished Lebanese - all living in the confines of the 1 square kilometer camp area. The main service provider for all the Palestinian refugees is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). UNRWA is struggling every year to manage a shrinking budget, which is provided by the international community to support UNRWA humanitarian, health and educational service provision to Palestinian refugees. UNRWA, local NGOs, and intermittently other international donors operate within the camp premises providing services and support aid to a growing population.

b. Sources – Drivers of Conflict

The main source of conflict in Beddawi is the dramatic increase in the Beddawi resident population. Over the past years, and more recently with the Syrian refugee crisis, the multiple fold increase in resident population has created a huge stress on the limited physical infrastructure and placed additional burdens on already scarce socio-economic and educational services in the Beddawi camp. Conflicts over the unjust distribution of water and electrical power, which can easily escalate into violence, are simply the result of over crowdedness and overstretched resources. Another source of potentially violent conflict is the spill over effects of the tensions and sometimes military conflicts between the Lebanese parties supporting the Syrian uprising and those fighting with the Syrian regime, as well as a growing state of tension between Lebanese Sunni and Shia communities. The older generation in Beddawi is afraid that its young people and even its older, now retired fighters will be drawn into inter-Lebanese affairs as mercenaries. Having few professional options and with employment opportunities largely closed to them, Palestinian

²⁶ Diab, Rakan. "Palestinian Families in Beddawi Camp Open their Homes for Syrian Refugees." Friday April 19, 2013. <http://www.savethechildren.net/article/palestinian-families-beddawi-camp-open-their-homes-syrian-refugees> .

refugees are the perfect targets for those seeking fighters for hire. This prospect of a return to militancy has created anxiety and tension among Palestinian refugee communities, especially those in Beddawi, where the main bulk of the Palestinian refugee community now lives. Illegal encroachments on public property through construction and other means constitute another major source of conflict in Beddawi. As recently as April 29 2013, three people were killed and nine wounded in clashes that erupted between residents of Beddawi refugee camp and the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF). The clashes erupted after residents in Wadi al-Nahleh held a violent protest against ISF personnel who were forcefully removing and destroying buildings that violated regulations and encroached on public property.

A major source of dissent in Beddawi is the perceived nepotism as well as lack of transparency and accountability of the Popular Committee and the Security Committee in charge of governing camp affairs and its internal security. It is important to note that the term 'popular' of the Popular Committee might be misleading as members of this committee are not elected but nominated to this position by the political leadership of the Palestinian factions in Beddawi. Thus, these committees are not accountable to an elected constituency but are nominated based on their power position in the Palestinian political leadership. Most of the recurrent and daily conflicts stem from the unequal and sometimes unjust distribution of water and electricity or other public services. Powerful or rich individuals exercise clout and influence to secure more privileges than allowed by the organized distribution system, thus creating feelings of anger and injustice among the weak and vulnerable populations. Dissatisfied, disenfranchised, idle and unemployed youth who cluster in groups in the streets or around girls' schools and behave or speak offensively to passing women and young girls are often the source of conflict that can escalate into disputes and fights. These youths, according to the workshop participants, do not have an outlet - a space for sports or other cultural activities where they can let off some steam while being engaged in constructive activities. Additionally, these youth feel disenfranchised by the older generation whom they perceive as inefficient and corrupt.

Besides these main sources of conflict, the workshop participants provided a list of other social and economic factors that drive conflict such as: poverty, unemployment, a deteriorating economic situation, a deteriorating political and security situation in the camp due to multiple factions and armed groups, failing social values, social ills and a culture of violence and repression, lack of acceptance of different opinions or religious beliefs or cultural values, lack of respect for 'authority' in schools, different cultures, long standing inter-family or inter tribal disputes, conflict over unsettled loans, lack of the rule of law, fight over resources, conflicts of interests, conflict over power, and influence of radical or militant religious groups.

c. Governance - Influential Interveners in Conflict

In contrast to the classical state control over Palestinian camps in the Arab countries, the situation in Lebanon's camps is radically different. Governance in Beddawi is constituted of a complex web of power structures composed of 'official' Palestinian governance institutions, political factions, UNRWA officials, civil society organizations and other stakeholders.

Camp Governance Institutions - Influential Leaders:

The Popular Committee (PLO and coalition)	The 'official' Palestinian governing body of the Beddawi camp acting similar to a local municipality in its role and decision making responsibilities in governing of the camp premises.
The Security Committee	The Palestinian equivalent of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces in charge of maintaining internal security of the camp and enforcing the decisions of the Popular Committee.
UNRWA Camp Officers	UNRWA is the sole 'official' provider of humanitarian, educational and health services as well as other forms of support to the Palestinian refugee population.
Political Factions	Mostly the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Islamist radical groups infiltrating the Palestinian camps.
Civil Society Organizations	Composed of Palestinian Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and NGOs active in the provision of services and support assistance to Palestinian vulnerable groups with the financial support of UNRWA and other international donors.
Notables	This group is composed of various 'power' figures such as the educated, the elderly, the rich and religious sheikhs and imams of mosques who are perceived by the population to have various levels of influence and who command respect.

d. Current Approaches to Conflict Resolution

The 'official' established mechanism for conflict mediation and resolution in the Beddawi camp is the 'Popular Committee'. If mediation efforts of the Popular Committee fail, the Committee's decisions would be enforced by the Security Committee. The problem lies in the fact that the Popular Committee is perceived by some to be corrupt and to exercise favoritism and nepotism towards certain people at the expense of actually seeking a just and fair settlement of the disputes. Other than the official representatives of the Popular Committee, influential leaders those indicated under 'Notables' in the table above, usually intervene in cases of conflict to assist the conflict parties in reaching an acceptable settlement of the dispute before the conflict degenerates into violence.

C.2: Berkayel Cluster - Akkar

a. **The Berkayel** locality in Caza Akkar covers, in addition to Berkayel, the neighboring communities of Bebnine, El Karkaf, Tel Hayat and Mashha. The following tables provide an overview of the main demographics and existing community socio-economic services and sectors.

Mashha	Hosting 290 Syrian refugee families
Location	Caza Akkar, 350 meters above sea level
Population	8,000 inhabitants
Governance	Municipality of 15 members & 2 Mukhtars
Economy	Agriculture: Olives, almonds, wheat, fruit trees, greenhouse cultivation, chicken farms Free trades, government employment mostly in the armed forces and educational sector, emigrants workers to the Arab and western countries
Education	1 public intermediary school, 1 public secondary school, 2 private schools, 1 vocational training school, 2 institutes for religious studies
Health – Social	1 health center, 4 community based organizations
Various	1 sports club, a basketball court, a football team

El Karkaf	Hosting 110 Syrian refugee families
Location	Caza Akkar, distance 110 km from Beirut & 300 meters above sea level
Population	7,500 inhabitants
Governance	Municipality of 12 members
Economy	Agriculture mostly Olives and animal husbandry Some government employment in the armed forces and education sector
Education	1 public school
Health – Social	1 private dispensary, 3 community based organizations
Various	1 sports club
Religion – Politics	Multiple largely Future Movement, Islamic Brotherhood and Syrian National Party

Berkayel	Hosting 150 Syrian refugee families
Location	Caza Akkar, distance 110 km from Beirut & 350 meters above sea level
Population	30,000 inhabitants
Governance	Municipality of 18 members & 2 mukhtars
Economy	Agriculture: Olives, grapes, figs, almonds Government employment mostly in the armed forces and education sector, small industries and artisanal works & free trades
Education	1 public intermediary school, 1 public secondary school, 2 private schools, 1 vocational training school, 1 institute for religious studies
Health – Social	2 dispensaries and 1 health center, 5 community based organizations
Various	1 sports club, 1 civil defense center
Religion – Politics	Sunni; Future Movement, Hezbollah, Syrian National Party, Salafist, Islamic Brotherhood

Bebnine	Hosting 2,000 Syrian refugees
Location	Caza Akkar, distance 105 km from Beirut & 100 meters above sea level
Population	40,000 inhabitants
Governance	Municipality of 18 members & mukhtars
Economy	Fishing, carpentry, small industries and artisanal works – 58 economic institutions of more than 5 employees Government employment mostly in the armed forces and education sector
Education	7 public elementary and intermediary schools, 1 public secondary school, 9 private schools, 1 public and 1 private vocational training institutions, 1 institute for religious studies
Health – Social	Public and private dispensaries, health centers and 8 private clinics, 6 community based organizations
Various	2 sports club, 1 civil defense center
Religion – Politics	Multiple parties mostly Future Movement and Islamic Brotherhood
Tal Hayat	Hosting 150 Syrian refugees
Location	Caza Akkar, distance 132 km from Beirut
Population	13,500 inhabitants
Governance	Municipality of 12 members
Economy	Agriculture
Education	---
Health – Social	Only religious Salafi associations
Various	
Religion – Politics	Sunni with minority Alawi

b. Sources - Drivers of Conflict

Identified by the community stakeholders during the workshop discussions, the main sources- drivers of conflict in the cluster of Berkayel can be summarized as follows:

Syrian Refugees: The communities of the Berkayel cluster host Syrian refugee families in varying numbers as listed in the community overview above. The longer the armed conflict continues and extends to new regions in Syria, the more Syrian families seek shelter and safety away from these regions. These refugees became a potential source of conflict for host communities for various reasons, the most important of which is the presence of increasing numbers of inhabitants putting additional pressures on limited community infrastructure and resourced such as water and electricity.

Additionally, the Lebanese inhabitants of these communities resent the selective humanitarian aid distribution to Syrian refugee families only; many feel that some of the Lebanese families are as deprived as the refugees. And deserve assistance. Other economic factors contribute to the ‘felt’ discrimination thus compounding potential sources of conflicts between host communities and the Syrian refugees.

These economic factors have been expressed by interviewed stakeholders as unfair competition over scant jobs and economic opportunities as “Syrians are willing to accept much less remuneration than Lebanese”, and that in “operating businesses without legal permits they incur lower costs”. Besides the negative economic impact, the Syrian refugees bring with them their own cultural traditions, which at times clash with the cultural habits of the Lebanese host communities. An increase in theft and various other security incidents has also been noted and attributed to the increased Syrian refugee presence in these communities.

Land: A major source of conflict in the Berkayel locality is disagreement over land. Encroachment on public property is a source of disagreement and potential conflict with the trespassers. Additionally, the land delineation or land boundaries of private properties are not delineated clearly, thus causing frequent disputes between the various owners. This problem is compounded when land is to be divided between numerous family members in cases of inheritance. In some cases, the lack of legal titles and/or property ownership documentation due to the lack of land mapping is cause for disagreements over land rights.

Environment: The lack of appropriate waste water infrastructure to channel and treat the waste water generated in some of the locality communities is causing conflicts with neighbouring communities (El Karkaf, Jdeidet El Kayteh, Ouyoun El Ghezlan, and Berkayel). Dirty water is dumped on their land without treatment creating environmental and health issues, infiltrating and contaminating ground water and also causing possible damage to the agricultural fields. In addition, the presence of chicken farms in residential areas is causing conflict between the farm owners and the residents as bad smells are emanating from these farms and are affecting the living environment of the inhabitants.

Municipal Councils/Governance: Municipal Councils of some of the Berkayel communities are riddled with internal conflicts. Conflict between council members can be due to opposing families, clans or political allegiances. Whatever the cause, conflict within local government institutions is negatively affecting the development of these communities and causing resentment among the population, who feel community issues are neglected in favour of personal self-interests. Additionally, in some communities of the Berkayel cluster, municipalities are perceived as inefficient, unaccountable and working for private rather than community interests. These local governments do not involve the youth and the various community groups in a transparent manner in municipal affairs and community issues.

In addition to the major drivers of conflict identified above, the workshop participants discussed a list of other social and economic factors that drive conflict such as: business disputes over money or unsettled loans, longstanding family and clan conflicts, family disputes, disagreements over electricity (such as generators subscriptions), the offensive behaviour of youth (including their use of improper language with passing women and girls reckless driving and hanging around girls’ schools), conflicts between the Syrian refugees over aid distribution or the formation of committees for channelling aid to the refugees, unemployment and other social ills.

c. Governance - Influential Interveners in Conflict

The following personalities and key positions have been identified by the locality stakeholders consulted in the process of this assessment as ‘influential individuals’ who can and might possibly intervene in resolving community conflicts: locality parliamentary representatives; municipal leaders (when they are not part of the conflict), mukhtars, prominent family leaders, religious sheikhs, influential individuals due to wealth or high position in government agencies and highly educated or well-known personalities. In short, people held in high esteem and well respected in the community.

d. Current Approaches to Conflict Resolution

There are no formally established conflict mediation mechanisms in the locality of the Berkayel cluster. When a conflict arises, it is traditional that a third party intervene to prevent the conflict from escalating further or to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflicting issue. Depending on the type of conflict or conflicting parties, the mediator can be any of the above mentioned leadership figures e.g. municipality president, mukhtar, religious sheikh or an influential person due to wealth, family or work position. The mediator/negotiator would engage in talks with both parties, sometimes calling for the intervention of an expert in specific matters related to the conflict issue (e.g. a land mapping expert when it comes to land related conflicts), or seeking political, family or religious influence to put pressure on the conflict parties to peacefully resolve the conflict. When mediation fails, the conflicting parties *might* resort to the judicial system seek an enforceable resolution through the law... meanwhile, however, resentment festers and can divide the families and community along the conflict lines. This system is traditional in rural areas of Lebanon.

C.3: Fnaydek – Akkar

As mentioned earlier, the community of Fnaydek is being considered as a secondary project locality due to the existing potential for cooperation with the UNDP “Strengthening Civil Peace in Lebanon” project. The aim would be to build on the groundwork instituted by UNDP and to take advantage of prospective synergies with the project. The following summary review is based on the UNDP Fnaydek community assessment and conflict analysis report of end 2012.

Fnaydek is a traditional agricultural community relying mainly on Apple growing and employment in the public sector as main sources of livelihood. The village is composed of ten main families and their various sub-branches. Family leaders (wajaha’a) still play a relatively prominent role in the community although the extent of their ‘authority’ is gradually diminishing in favor of politicians affiliated with national level coalitions and the newly educated professionals. The women role in Fnaydek is traditional, mainly restricted to the home with very limited contribution to community affairs and a general lack of access to decision making positions. The following table overview main demographics and community socio-economic services and sectors:

Fnaydek	Hosting 1,800 Syrian refugees
Location	El Qayteh- Caza Akkar at a distance of 120 km from Beirut & 25 km from Halba the capital of the Caza
Population	25,000 inhabitants
Governance	Municipality of 18 members & 4 mukhtars
Economy	Agriculture mainly apple trees Public jobs mostly in the armed forces and the education sector, small businesses
Education	1 public secondary school, 3 public primary & intermediary schools, 3 private schools and 1 vocational training institute
Health – Social	2 dispensaries and 2 resident doctors, 7 community based and national organizations
Various	---
Religion – Politics	Sunni; Future Movement; former parliament representative Ba’arini allied with 8 th of March coalition, some Islamic groups

b. Sources – Drivers of Conflict

Findings of the UNDP conflict assessment for Fnaydek resulted in the prioritization of three main sources of recurrent conflict:

Irrigation Water - Rights and Distribution: As an agricultural community producing 1/3 of the country's apple produce, Fnaydek agricultural sector rely heavily on irrigation water. There are two main water springs for irrigation in Fnaydek and water is distributed to farmers and lands following a water rights system that dates back from the Ottoman times. A representative from every family, a "shawy" distributes the allocated water time to lands and families following the farmers' needs and size of the land. Expansion of the farmed land, water losses due to inadequate water channelling structures in addition to environmental changes that decreased the flow of the water springs and other factors are all causes for decreasing availability of water for irrigation. Conflicts over water often arise between the shawy and the farmers on the amount of water allocated to their lands. These conflicts can sometimes expand beyond the primary parties and water related issues to personal, political and family related conflicts.

Community Power Structures: Control of political positions of authority in the village including leadership of the municipality and political representation" in parliamentary elections is a major source of conflict in Fnaydek. The community is divided along the following power lines (1) between the previous mayor and the current municipality leaders; (2) Baa'rini a former parliamnetarian allied with the March 8th movement opposed to supporters of Hariri and the Future Movement; (3) between the ten leading families of Fnaydek especially at times of elections; (4) the traditional leadership of the family elders with the emerging village elite deriving their power from political affiliation, education or profession; and (5) families of sheikhs with the status of their past family religious standing compared to the Fallaheen or peasants to which all the other families belong.

Young Thugs: Referred to as Zu'ran in Arabic, such conflicts are described by the party involved in the conflict rather than the issues over which the conflict is taking place which can be anything from tree cutting, sexual harassment, road incidents etc. These issues easily escalate into armed violence as the young thugs are supported and protected from justice by powerful local politicians or influential parties. In addition to the above major sources of conflict, Fnaydek community leadership discussed during the UNDP led conflict assessment workshop the following drivers of conflict in their community:

Agriculture: in addition to the irrigation water issues, payment of dues from the sale of the apple agricultural produce between the farmers and the wholesaler buyers. Also sometimes between the farmers and the agricultural companies selling fertilizers and pesticides.

Social: Public harassment of young girls by young men especially in the environs of schools. Also eloping couples who marry without the consent of the families which is cause for conflict between the groom and the bride's respective families. Unfair distribution of inheritance between male and female family members.

Community Resources: Illegal abuse of public resources and properties such as illegal tree cutting, encroaching on public land, illegal building, roads and traffic related conflicts, distribution of potable water etc.

Land delineation: in the Qamoua'a region between Fnaydek and neighbouring villages. Also, land property surveys within the boundaries of Fnaydek.

Finally, it is important to note that the Syrian refugee issue is still of minor importance in terms of source of conflict in Fnaydek since the numbers of these families is still comparatively small.

c. Governance - Influential Interveners in Conflict

The divisions which exist within the community various family, political and local government power structures can both be a source for conflict escalation and also present potential for conflict interventions and possible mediators.

d. Current Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Historically, an informal village council (majless qaryeh) with representatives of the ten main Fnaydek families acted as the community conflict mediation mechanism. The village council was initially created to address forests/wood related conflicts and later evolved into the village conflict mediation mechanism intervening in conflicts where needed and thus maintaining the 'elite' and influential status of the families and family's 'elders'.

Traditionally, family elders and/or individuals with social status that command respect in the community are called upon in cases of conflicts. Consultations take place to identify the most appropriate person to mediate between the conflicting parties where the intervener often play the role of arbitrator rather than that of a mediator. Sometimes, the intervener contributes to the aggrieved party financially or in kind to settle a dispute and or uses personal clout to convince the conflict parties to reach an agreement.

Following the end of the Lebanese civil war, the election of municipal councils and mukhtars, introduced officially elected community leaders thus limiting to a certain extent the informal authority of the village council who still intervenes in cases of conflicts between families or individuals as influential leaders in the community.

The present Fnaydek municipality has attempted to form a local reconciliation and conflict mediation mechanism. Unfortunately, this effort was not met with success though it demonstrates readiness and willingness to engage in such an undertaking. Finally, it is noteworthy to mention that it was deemed appropriate by some of the UNDP interviewed community leaders to sometimes resort to threats of violence as a possible conflict management option.

IV - CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The conflict baseline assessment and mapping has analysed the macro situation in the project area, highlighted community conflict sources and drivers in the selected localities of Beddawi and Berkayel cluster and summarized the findings of the UNDP conflict assessment for Fnaydek. This assessment and analysis was undertaken in a participatory manner that involved national and local stakeholders as well as consultants and staffs of both PDCI and PeaceLabz. It is suggested that a more detailed and in-depth analysis of a select number of issues - which will be tackled by the ECRC project - be undertaken during the process of building the local capacities for conflict mediation and as a practical part of the training process.

Meanwhile, the following are suggestions and recommendations for the project's next steps, namely, the selection of Local Conflict Conciliators and the development of a framework for the Community Supervisory Committee or what has been referred to in the project document as the working group and finally suggestions for possible intervention areas.

Criteria for Selection of Local Community Conciliators: The following criteria are suggested for the selection of the community leaders/volunteers to be trained by the project as Local Community Conciliators. These criteria were discussed with the locality leaderships during the introductory workshops.

Education: ‘Secondary level education with preference for a college degree holder’. The education of the candidate is important in the sense that an educated person will be more open to change and appreciation of new approaches to conflict mitigation.

Age: ‘Age of the candidate ought to be between 25 years and 40 years’. The rationale being that this age category would bring with it enough maturity and also motivation and dynamism for volunteering in community issues.

Gender: ‘Both genders can apply to be trained as LCC’. Care should be taken to have a gender balanced group in the final selection of LCCs for each locality or at the very least that the group includes female candidates.

Familiarity with Community: Knowledge of the community, of its various stakeholder groups, and of formal and informal leaderships is advised. This experience would be instrumental in conducting conflict analysis and proposing mitigating actions.

Previous Community Involvement: It is highly desired that an applicant for LCC training demonstrates interest in community affairs through past or current volunteer involvement in community issues or work in community based organizations (CBOs).

Training: Attendance and participation in previous trainings in community related affairs, volunteerism, etc is an added asset as it provides a basis for the conflict mitigation training and later work with the project.

Personal Traits: Social aptitude, willingness to listen, accepting of others points of view, a civic sense of civic responsibility, and a positive attitude.

Finally, it is imperative that the LCC confirms his/her willingness to volunteer and his/her readiness for continued engagement with the project following the training.

Community Supervisory Committee

The ECRC project design has proposed the formation of a committee or working group of community leaders in each locality to support the project. Again, discussions during the workshop with key locality leaders resulted in the following suggested framework for this committee:

The Community Supervisory Committee will be composed of volunteer key community leaders, influential individuals either in terms of their position within the community or because of their relationships with influential parties and groups. The committee would include approximately ten members per locality. These members can either volunteer to participate in the committee or be invited by the project to become a member because their involvement would add positive influence and credibility. It is important that members of these committees are held in respect and esteem by the majority of community members and that they are not party to a major ongoing community conflict.

The role of the Community Supervisory Committee would consist primarily of supporting the work of the LCCs and supervising the implementation of the ECRC conflict mitigation initiatives.

Their main input would consist of facilitating the implementing of the project initiatives by interacting with conflict parties and key influential leaders in times of need.

The Community Supervisory Committee for each locality would meet intermittently -approximately every two months and in cases of need or emergent matters - with the LCCs and the project team to share information about project progress and upcoming issues, assist in the review and selection of the conflict mitigation's grants among other responsibilities. Most notably, the committee members should commit to the project and the achievement of its objectives through volunteering time and investing efforts in fulfilling their supervisory - support role.

Recommendations for Project Interventions

The interventions by the ECRC project in conflict mitigation will be determined by the LCCs subsequent to their training in conflict mitigation and submission of proposals for grants' funding. The following are recommended broad guidelines to assist in determining the project's future interventions starting with what needs to be avoided and ending with possible project's initiatives:

Avoid a direct address of historic, religious, political base conflicts: These conflicts are too complex and deep rooted to be addressed within the present scope and time limit of the ECRC project. The best possible project intervention in this area and within the current country tension climate is to undertake intensive awareness campaigns through public town hall meeting style to highlight the dangers and fall outs of conflict on the development of these communities. The aim of these campaigns would be to create a changed awareness which might negatively affect in the long run the intensity and recurrence of these conflicts.

Conflict over resources - mostly land and water - is mainly due to nepotism, corruption and a general lack of knowledge and enforcement of the rule of law. Again, these types of conflicts can hardly be challenged at present due to the prevailing country circumstances.

Promoting awareness in the target localities of the negative fall outs of such practices on the development of these communities can create in the long run a changed awareness in the community to pressure local leaderships against such practices by exercising their power to endorse - vote for leaders - individuals who promote the rule of law.

This assessment has identified issues that goes beyond the borders of each locality and are shared as a conflict driver in all of the ECRC targeted localities. Such issues are conflict over land delineation, surveying and youth. With regards to land issues, it can be rewarding for the project to undertake research and consultations with experts in this area to determine best possible approaches to address such conflicts and to bring this knowledge to the community through training for community leaders to inform, lobby and build their internal capacities to address such community conflicts constructively. On the youth issues, it is of critical importance for the community to find ways and means to involve unemployed and disenfranchised youth in constructive community affairs and decision making rather than to simply note and complain of the disruptive and negative effects of the youth energies when not properly channelled. Similarly to the land issue above, research in best practices in this area can lead to creative interventions and incentives for all parties to involve youth in community development that goes beyond the divisive fault lines of religious, political and national affairs.

The Syrian refugee crisis does not seem to abate any time soon and the refugee families will be staying in Lebanon for still some time. This fact entails the urgent identification of long term strategies to address this problem jointly between the Lebanese and Syrian families. Possible approaches to be further assessed for feasibility by the project can be to find a shared space where representatives of both parties - Lebanese hosts communities and Syrian refugee families - can meet regularly, discuss and find adequate solutions for addressing the tensions created by the refugee population. These meetings would be facilitated by the trained LCC in cooperation with the locality supervisory committees.

Mitigating Factors: Finally, and before concluding this conflict assessment report, it is important to mention that the project should take advantage of locally available mitigating factors to build upon in promoting locally owned conflict mediation mechanisms. These factors are first and foremost the willingness of the locality leaderships to cooperate with the project and to facilitate the institution and endorsement of the project conflict mediation mechanisms. Secondly, local leaderships are very aware of the dangers of the present national and hence local subdivisions along the political and religious lines having witnessed first-hand the destructive effects of the Lebanese civil war. Lastly, there exist within each locality basics of traditional conflict mediation approaches and strategies which can be developed by the project to further develop local capacities to mitigate conflict.



ANNEXES

Annex A: Desk Review

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ANNEX B: TEMPLATE FOR CONSULTATIONS

< Template > Consultations with experts and stakeholders

Questions asked during consultations

Prepared by Jean-Paul Chami for PeaceLabz

Version: April 13, 2013

With:

- [Name of interviewee]

Interviewed by: Jean-Paul

Date and place:

Place of living or roots (especially if interviewee is a stakeholder in one of the localities of interest to the project):

How first contact was made:

Title(s):

- [professional title of interviewee]

Minute written by:

Time:

Age:

[Possible] future engagement (in the project):

- What are the types of conflicts witnessed in Northern Lebanon (or in Lebanon in general)?
- What are Gaps/challenges for building peace in Northern Lebanon? In Lebanon in general?
- What are some of the past peace building work / initiatives / projects that you are aware of or have been part of?
- Area(s) / localities of focus in this conversation
- Info relevant for the profiler of areas discussed here current issues / causes for possible conflicts (International / local aid related, Political / relational, Security / safety, Economic, - Environment / public health, social / demographic/religious, resources; cultural, gender and education)
- Chronology / History [of the region] related major impactful events on conflict
- How do people resolve conflicts among the members of the community?
- What is the role of the authorities?
- How is the involvement of women?
- What are lessons learnt from your experiences?
- What are some **recommendations and ideas** by interviewee(s) as to working on peace building and conflict resolution in the mentioned areas?
- What are some **Resources for peace (connectors)** in the areas mentioned here?
- How do you think we can link individuals/groups in networks across differences?
- What are some **Challenges for peace (spoilors/dividers)** in the areas mentioned here?
- What are some **suggested areas to work in?**
- What are some [Suggested] **Contacts** (influencing individuals or organizations) to approach for coming [deeper layer] consultations or to engage them on the local or national level?
- What **assets** do the interviewee(s) for possible collaboration on this project?
- What is the interviewee's experience working on peacebuilding related topics/projects? (what projects has he/she been involved in?)
- What possible future conflicts does the interviewee project to happen in the near or middle level future?
- Which **Possible partners** could be interesting for our project and interested in it?
- What **materials** / documents did the interviewee suggest for us to review?
- What events are coming up in your area in the coming months (festivals, holidays, etc.)?



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